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Democracy Beyond Parties
Abstract
This paper is concerned primarily with the way in which the changing char-
acter of political parties impacts upon their standing, legitimacy, and effective-
ness. We see an emerging notion of democracy that is being steadily stripped
of its popular component–a notion of democracy without a demos. As I try to
show in this paper, much of this has to do with the failings of political parties.
I am not suggesting that there has been a wholesale failure of parties; rather,
I am seeking to draw attention to an ongoing process in which there are party
failings, and in which democracy itself tends to adapt and change to these fail-
ings. This process then provokes its own momentum, in which parties become
steadily weaker, and in which democracy becomes even more stripped down.
  
  CSD  Center for the Study of Democracy 
          An Organized Research Unit 
            University of California, Irvine 
  www.democ.uci.edu 
This paper derives from a wider project on the politics of popular democracy, and is 
concerned primarily with the way in which the changing character of political parties impacts 
upon their standing, legitimacy, and effectiveness.1 The argument that is developed here owes 
much to that originally advanced by E.E. Schattschneider in The Semi-Sovereign People 
(1960) and to his contention that control over political decision-making sometimes lay beyond 
the reach of the ordinary citizen. This was a familiar theme in the political science literature of 
the 1960s, and was echoed in different ways, and differently contested, by a variety of critical 
scholars in the so-called pluralist-elitist debate, including Bachrach and Baratz, Dahl, Dye and 
Zeigler, Kariel, Lukes, and others. But although that particular debate has been put to rest, 
Schattschneider’s thesis seems to me to remain highly relevant – albeit now in a stronger and 
less equivocal form. Indeed, almost a half-century after Schattschneider, I would argue that 
even semi-sovereignty appears to be slipping away, and that the people, or the ordinary 
citizenry, are becoming effectively non-sovereign. What we now see emerging is a notion of 
democracy that is being steadily stripped of its popular component–a notion of democracy 
without a demos. As I try to show in this paper, much of this has to do with the failings of 
political parties. Note that I am not suggesting that there has been a wholesale failure of parties; 
rather, I am seeking to draw attention to an ongoing process, in which there are party failings, 
and in which democracy itself tends to adapt and change to these failings. This process then 
provokes its own momentum, in which parties become steadily weaker, and in which 
democracy becomes even more stripped down.  
 The paper begins with a discussion of the phenomenon of indifference to politics and to 
democracy, and then goes on to review some of the literature about the renewal and redefinition 
of democracy. Section 4 offers an overview of the failings of party, focussing on popular 
withdrawal and disengagement from conventional politics, on the one hand, and on elite 
withdrawal into the institutions, on the other hand. The paper then concludes with a discussion 
in Section 5 of the fallouts from this process of mutual withdrawal  
 
1. Democracy and Indifference 
 
When I first began to consider the notion of non-sovereignty, I associated it primarily with 
indifference: indifference towards politics, on the one hand, and indifference towards 
democracy, on the other. Indifference has always been one of the more neglected elements in 
the study of the relationship between citizens and politics, and its importance seemed to be 
badly underestimated by much of the literature on political trust and mistrust that emerged in 
the late 1990s–see, for example, Pharr and Putnam (2000), Norris (1999), etcetera. From my 
reading, the real problem at issue here was not trust as such, at least in the sense of there being a 
problem of popular mistrust in politicians and governments; rather, it was one of interest, or 
lack of interest, such that the sense of hostility which some citizens clearly felt towards their 
political leaders seemed less important than the indifference with which many more citizens 
                                                 
1 A previous version was presented at the workshop “Political Parties and Democracy”, ECPR Joint Sessions, 
Granada, April 2005. Work on this paper was facilitated by financial support from the Dutch Scientific Research 
Council (NWO), grant no. 403-01-006. Earlier versions were presented to seminars at Nuffield College, Oxford, 
and the European University Institute, Florence, as well as to the 2004 Summer School on Parties. 
viewed the political world more generally. To put it another way, whether politicians were liked 
or disliked, or trusted or distrusted, seemed to matter less than whether they were seen as 
important or ‘necessary’ to citizens’ life situations. Of course, the dividing line between 
indifference and hostility is not always very pronounced, and, as de Tocqueville once observed, 
the loss of function can easily breed contempt for those who continue to base their privileges on 
its exercise. But even if indifference did lead on to hostility or lack of trust, it remained an 
important variable in its own right, and hence it was also worth recognizing that politics and 
politicians might simply be deemed irrelevant by many ordinary citizens (see also van Deth 
2000). 
 Indifference and disinterest were not just a problem on the ground, moreover, and were 
not confined to what could be seen in popular attitudes. They were also compounded by the new 
rhetoric being employed by various politicians in the 1990s, as well as by the growing anti-
political sentiment that was to be seen in the literature on policy-making, institutional reform, 
and governance (see also Schedler 1997). Here too it seemed that politics as a process was often 
being denigrated or devalued; here too it seemed that indifference to politics was acquiring 
more weight. Within the world of the politicians, the most obvious case was, of course, Tony 
Blair, who famously set himself up as being above politics and political partisanship, claiming 
in a BBC2 interview during his first terms Prime Minister that “I was never really in politics. I 
never grew up as a politician. I don’t feel myself a politician even now” (broadcast of 30 
January, 2000). Blair was also at pains to caution against the belief in the problem-solving 
capacity of politics. For Blair, the purpose of his new ‘progressive’ politics was not to provide 
solutions from above, but to facilitate citizens in searching for their own solutions – “to help 
people make the most of themselves.” Politics in this sense was not about exercising the 
‘directive hand’ of government, but about bringing together ‘dynamic markets’ and ‘strong 
communities.’ (Blair 2001). In other words, the role of politics was to offer synergy and 
opportunity, and in Blair’s ideal world it would eventually become redundant. As one of his 
close cabinet colleagues was later to remark, “depoliticizing of key decision-making is a vital 
element in bringing power closer to the people” (Lord Falconer, as quoted by Flinders and 
Buller 2004). At one level, this was of course a simple populist strategy – employing the 
rhetoric of ‘the people’ in order to suggest that there had been a radical break with past styles 
of government. At another level, however, it was an approach that gelled perfectly well with 
the tenets of what were then seen as newly emerging schools of ‘governance’ – and with the 
idea that “society is now sufficiently well organized through self-organizing networks that 
any attempts on the part of government to intervene will be ineffective and perhaps 
counterproductive” (Peters 2002: 4). In this perspective, government becomes subordinate 
and more deferential, and no longer seeks to wield power or even exercise authority. Its 
relevance declines, while that of non-governmental institutions and practices increases. In 
Beck’s terms, the dynamic migrates from politics with a large ‘P’ to politics with a small ‘p’ – 
or to what he variously calls ‘subpolitics’ (e.g., Beck 1992: 183-236) 
  Anti-political sentiments were also becoming more evident in the policy-making 
literature of the late 1990s. In 1997, Alan S. Blinder published an influential article in Foreign 
Affairs expressing his concern that government in the US was becoming ‘too political’ 
(Blinder 1997). Blinder, who was then a leading professor of economics, and deputy head of 
the Federal Reserve, and hence a weighty contributor to this debate, suggested extending the 
model of the Federal Reserve in particular, and of independent Central Banks in general, to 
other key policy areas, such that decisions on health policy, the welfare state, and so on, 
would be taken out of the hands of elected politicians and passed over to the control of 
nonpartisan experts. According to Blinder, the solutions that politics could offer were often 
suboptimal, and hence the role of politicians in policy-making should be marginalized, or at 
least confined to those difficult areas in which the judgement of experts would not be 
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sufficient to legitimize outcomes. Similar arguments were emerging in the European context. 
In 1996, for example, Giandomenico Majone argued that the role of expert decision-making 
in the policy-making process was superior to that of political decision-making in that it could 
take better account of long-term interests. Politicians, by definition, worked only in the short-
term, or at least were only capable of committing themselves in the short-term, and hence to 
cede control of policy-making to politicians, and to allow decisions to be dominated by 
considerations of the electoral cycle, was to risk less optimal outcomes: “the segmentation of 
the democratic process into relatively short time periods has serious negative consequences 
when the problems faced by society require long-term solutions” (Majone 1996: 10). The 
solution, as in the case with Blinder’s advocacy of the Federal Reserve model, was to delegate 
powers to institutions “which, by design, are not directly accountable to voters or to their 
elected representatives” (1996: 3) – or to what Majone defined as non-majoritarian 
institutions.2 This also brought other benefits, in that experts enjoyed the advantage of being 
better able to deal with the complexities of modern law-making, and with the many technical 
problems which often stymied or confused elected politicians. As traditional forms of state 
control were replaced by more complex regulatory frameworks, expertise rather than political 
judgement was likely to prove more valuable and effective (Majone 2003: 299). Here too, 
then, politics was becoming devalued, with the potential contribution of politicians 
themselves to the policy process being seen as either irrelevant or even damaging.  
 By the late 1990s, in short, it seemed that neither the citizens, on the one hand, nor the 
policy-makers, on the other, were keen to privilege the role of political or partisan decision-
making. Even the new breed of third-way politician seemed ready to take a back seat. As far 
as politics was concerned, and perhaps even as far as the democratic process more generally 
was concerned, reason was deemed superior to interest. It was in this sense that the role of 
indifference needed to be highlighted. 
 But while the different sources of evidence did indeed point to a widespread sense of 
indifference to politics and to politicians, they seemed to offer a much less robust foundation 
for the notion of indifference towards democracy as such. Indeed, if one looked at the debates 
about constitutional reform during the late 1990s, as well as at the more theoretical literature, 
the impression that was received was of a large and burgeoning interest in democracy, with 
more attention being paid to how democratic systems worked, and to what they meant in 
reality, than probably at any stage in the previous twenty or thirty years. Democracy was on 
the agenda in the late 1990s, and far from being treated with indifference, it had become a 
research priority within both empirical political science and political theory. Already in 1997, 
for example, Collier and Levitsky were able to document some 500 different scholarly uses of 
the term, a number that has probably increased even more substantially since then. The 
catalogues of academic publishers were also beginning to brim over with new titles on 
democracy, such as Oxford University Press, for example, which posted as the lead 
publication in the 2002 political theory catalogue Robert Goodin’s Reflective Democracy, 
closely followed by Iris Young’s Inclusion and Democracy, John Dryzek’s Deliberative 
Democracy and Beyond, and Henry Richardson’s Democratic Autonomy – all published for 
the first time or in new editions in 2002. Democracy was also becoming more of an issue on 
the daily political agenda, with debates on institutional reform beginning to play a substantial 
                                                 
2 There is some sleight-of-hand in this definition. Majone (1996: 12) comes to the notion of non-majoritarian 
institutions via a reference to Lijphart’s (1984) distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracies, and 
hence, by implication, Majone’s idea of non-majoritarianism is equivalent to Lijphart’s idea of consensus. This 
is not in fact the case, however. In contrast to Lijphart’s idea of consensus democracy, which depends on 
elections, parties and political accountability, Majone’s non-majoritarian institutions are depoliticized and are 
expressly removed from the electoral and partisan process. For Lijphart, the contrast with majoritarian 
democracy is consensus democracy; for Majone, the contrast with majoritarian democracy is expert rule, or non-
democracy. 
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role in a large number of western polities, with various emphases on ‘participatory 
governance’ beginning to emanate from the World Bank and other international 
organizations, and with discussions of the reform of the European Union polity achieving a 
degree of salience that would have been almost unimaginable ten years before–as, for 
example, could be seen in the lead-up to and the discussion of the European Commission 
White Paper on Governance in 2001, and its attention to participation and openness. By the 
end of the 1990s, democracy–whether associative, deliberative, or reflective; global, 
transnational, or inclusive; electoral, illiberal, or even just Christian–had become a hot topic. 
At these levels at least–that is, institutionally and within the academy–indifference didn’t 
seem to figure. 
 
2. Indifference and the Renewal of Democracy 
 
Which leads me to my first puzzle: as the century turns, we can see clear and quite consistent 
evidence of popular indifference to conventional politics (I deal with this at greater length 
later) and, more arguably, of popular indifference to democracy, or at least to playing a part in 
the sort of conventional politics that is usually seen as necessary to sustain democracy; and 
yet, when it comes to the intellectual level, and sometimes even to the level of practical 
institutional reforms, we see a massive renewal of interest in democracy (if not necessarily in 
politics as such–see above). How do we square these developments?  
 There are two possibilities. The first is that they are in fact related, and that the 
growing intellectual and institutional interest in democracy is in part a response to the 
expanding scale of popular indifference. That is, it reflects a concern with combating that 
indifference. In other words, we get a lot of discussion about democracy, its meanings, and its 
renewal, at the moment when ordinary citizens begin to pull away from conventional forms of 
democratic engagement. Making democracy relevant comes on to the agenda at the time when 
it otherwise risks becoming irrelevant.  
 But while the timing suggests that this may be the case, the actual content of the 
discussion suggests a different story. For, far from seeking to encourage greater citizen 
participation, or trying to make democracy more meaningful for the ordinary citizen, many of 
the discussions of institutional reforms, on the one hand, and of the theory of democracy, on 
the other, seem to concur in favouring options that actually discourage mass engagement. This 
can be seen, for example, in the emphasis on stake-holder involvement rather than electoral 
participation that is to be found in both associative democracy and participatory governance, 
and in the emphasis on the sort of exclusive and reasoned debate that is to be found in 
deliberative and reflective democracy. In neither case is there real scope afforded to 
conventional modalities of mass democracy. It can also be seen in the new emphasis that is 
placed on output-oriented legitimacy in discussions of the European Union polity, and in the 
related idea that democracy in the EU requires “solutions that are ‘beyond the state’ and, 
perhaps, also beyond the conventions of western style representative liberal democracy” 
(Shaw 2000: 291). In other words, while there may be concern with the problem of popular 
indifference to democracy, making democracy more mass-user friendly does not seem to be 
the favoured answer. For Philip Pettit (2001: §46), for example, who discusses the issue of 
democratic renewal in the context of deliberation and depoliticization, the issue comes on to 
the agenda because “democracy is too important to be left to the politicians, or even to the 
people voting in referendums.” For Fareed Zakaria (2003: 248), in his more popular account, 
renewal is necessary because “what we need in politics today is not more democracy but 
less.”  
 Hence the second possibility: the renewal of interest in democracy and its meanings at 
the intellectual and institutional levels is not intended to open up or reinvigorate democracy as 
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such, but is rather intended to redefine democracy in such a way that it can cope more easily 
with, and adapt to, the decline of popular interest and engagement. Rather than being an 
answer to disengagement, the contemporary concern with renewing democracy is about 
coming to terms with disengagement. In other words, what we see here is a wide-ranging 
attempt to define democracy in a way that does not require any substantial emphasis on 
popular sovereignty – at the extreme, it is an attempt to redefine democracy in the absence of 
the demos.  
Part of this process of redefinition lies in highlighting the distinction between what has 
been called ‘constitutional democracy’, on the one hand, and what I also refer to here as 
‘popular democracy’, on the other, a division that overlaps with and echoes Robert Dahl’s 
(1956) earlier distinction between ‘Madisonian democracy’ and ‘populistic democracy’ (see 
also Mény & Surel 2002; Dahl 1999; Eisenstadt 1999). On the one hand, there is the 
constitutional component – that which emphasises the need for checks and balances across 
institutions and which entails government for the people; on the other hand, there is the 
popular component – that which emphasises the role of the ordinary citizen and popular 
participation, and which entails government by the people. In other words, these are two 
separate components that co-exist with and complement one another. At the same time, 
however, though conceived of as two elements within a ‘unified’ sense of democracy, we also 
now begin the see them being disaggregated, and then being contrasted with one another both 
in theory and practice (see also Mair 2002a: 83). Hence, for example, the recently emerging 
notions of ‘illiberal’ or ‘electoral’ democracy (Diamond 1996; Zakaria 1997) and the attempt 
to separately categorize those democracies that combine the provision of free elections– 
popular democracy–with restrictions on rights and freedoms, and with the potential abuse of 
executive power. As many studies of Third Wave democracies in particular seem to indicate, 
popular and constitutional democracy are no longer necessarily bound together.  
 Not only can we identify a growing conceptual distinction between the popular and 
constitutional components, therefore, but we can also see evidence of the distinction 
becoming more important in practice. And with this development comes also the relative 
weighing process, in which the popular element becomes downgraded with respect to the 
constitutional element. Once democracy is divided into its popular and constitutional 
elements, in other words, the centrality of the popular element begins to be downplayed. For 
Zakaria, for example, it is the presence of the constitutional rather than the popular 
component which is essential for the survival and well-being of democracy, and it is also the 
reason why democracy has proved so successful in the west. As he put it (1997: 27): “For 
much of modern history, what characterized governments in Europe and North America, and 
differentiated them from those around the world, was not democracy but constitutional 
liberalism. The ‘Western model’ is best symbolized not by the mass plebiscite but the 
impartial judge.” In this view it is not elections – or not elections as such – that make for 
democracy, but rather the courts, or at least the combination of courts with other modes of 
non-electoral participation. Moreover, as some of the good governance literature implies with 
respect to the developing countries, there already exists a relatively clear formula: NGOs + 
judges = democracy. That is, while an emphasis on ‘civil society’ is acceptable, and while a 
reliance on legal procedures is essential, elections as such should not necessarily be valued 
(see also Chua 2003). 
 A similar reasoning can be seen in various applications to constitutional reform in the 
advanced democracies and to reforms within the EU context in particular, in that here too 
democracy is sometimes redefined in a way that downgrades the importance of popular pillar. 
As Michelle Everson (2000: 106) has noted in her discussion of Majone’s work, for example, 
“non-majoritarian thought…forcefully claims that its isolation of market governance from 
political forces serves the goal of democracy by safeguarding the democratically set goals of 
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the polity from the predatory inclinations of a transitory political elite.” In this case the 
opposition is unequivocal: in one corner, the goals of the polity, objectively defined; in the 
other, the claims of a transitory–because elected–and hence predatory elite. The one is 
sustained by the networks of good governance, the other by the crude power and ambition of 
electoral politics. There is clearly no contest here. In other arenas, and in the context of 
different processes, the story appears the same. In their review of new modes of delegation, 
for example, Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002: 19) underline the growing importance of 
‘procedural legitimacy’, which “relies on a process of decision making by NMIs [Non-
Majoritarian institutions] being better than the insular, often secret, deliberations of cabinets 
and executives.” In this case, the benefits of transparency, legality and the provision of access 
to stakeholders are held up against the limits and distortions induced by partisan politics, and 
are seen to lead to a process which can offer “a fair and democratic substitute for electoral 
accountability.” The shift becomes even more pronounced when we see the importing into 
political processes of the standards set by the New Public Management. In this case, the forms 
of accountability avoid not only the electoral channel, but also the public sector writ large, 
being driven instead by values of cost-efficiency, fair procedure, and performance (see, for 
example, Peters 2003: 125). 
This, in turn, leads me to a second puzzle: If democracy is being redefined to 
downgrade its popular component, then why is this happening, and why now? In other words, 
why does this particular shift occur barely one decade after the much heralded ‘victory of 
democracy’ (e.g., Hadenius 1997), and at a moment when, for the first time in history, 
democracy is acclaimed as having become ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1996)? 
Having seen democracy triumph, why does there now appear to be a concern to limit its 
scope? 
 In the wider project of which this paper is part, I discuss a number of different but 
related answers to this question–including the impact of the end of the Cold War, the decline 
of ‘embedded liberalism’, the declining purchase of party government, and the more general 
fallout from processes of globalization and Europeanization. In this particular paper I wish to 
explore a more basic answer, however, in that I wish to suggest that the shift from popular to 
constitutional democracy, and the concomitant downgrading of politics and of electoral 
processes, is in part a consequence of the failings of political parties. As parties fail, so too 
fails popular democracy. Or, to put it another way, thanks to the failings of parties, popular 
democracy can no longer function in the way in which we have come to understand and 
accept it, and in the way it has always functioned up to now. By going beyond parties, 
democracy also manages to get beyond popular involvement and control. 
 
3. Parties and Democracy 
 
Some twenty years before publishing the The Semi-Sovereign People, Schattschneider (1942: 
1) famously proposed that democracy without parties was unthinkable. The phrase itself 
comes from the opening paragraph of his Party Government, and is worth citing in its full 
context: 
“The rise of political parties is indubitably one of the principal distinguishing marks of 
modern government. The parties, in fact, have played a major role as makers of 
governments, more especially they have been the makers of democratic government. It 
should be stated flatly at the outset that this volume is devoted to the thesis that the 
political parties created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in 
terms of parties. As a matter of fact, the condition of the parties is the best possible 
evidence of the nature of any regime. The most important distinction in modern 
political philosophy, the distinction between democracy and dictatorship, can be made 
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best in terms of party politics. The parties are not therefore merely appendages of 
modern government; they are in the center of it and play a determinative and creative 
role in it.” 
As always in the writings of this period, of course, democracy in this case was both popular 
and constitutional; it was the democracy of elections as well as of checks and balances, and 
the democracy of mandates, popular accountability, and representative government. This was 
the democracy that Schattschneider found unthinkable except in terms of parties, and his 
sheer conviction has led to his proposition being cited by party scholars, especially in their 
own defence, ever since. Thus, for example, it is argued that despite all the problems facing 
parties, and despite different and cumulative challenges, they will continue to survive, as 
Schattschneider suggests, as long as democracy survives. This is one of the key motifs in 
Dalton and Wattenberg’s (2000) assessment, for example, which begins by asking readers to 
‘think Schattschneider’s unthinkable’ and to consider what might happen should parties fail, 
and which concludes on a more sanguine note by reaffirming that “it remains difficult to think 
of national governments functioning without parties playing a significant role in connecting 
the various elements of the political process” (p. 275).  
 But if we take account of the different components of democracy, and then think 
Schattschneider’s proposition through to its potentially logical conclusion, we may come to a 
different answer. In other words, while Schattschneider’s proposition is usually taken by party 
scholars to mean that the survival of democracy will guarantee the survival of parties (and 
since the survival of democracy is guaranteed, this means that the survival of parties is also 
guaranteed) we can also read it the other way around, to suggest that the failure of parties 
might indeed imply the failure of democracy; or, adopting Dalton and Wattenberg’s terms, to 
suggest that the failure of parties might imply the failure of modern [representative] 
government. If democracy, or representative government, is unthinkable save in terms of 
parties, then perhaps, facing party failings, it does indeed become unthinkable, or unworkable.  
Without parties, and still following Schattschneider, we are then either left with no 
real democracy and no real system of representative government; or with what continues to be 
called democracy, but which has been redefined so as to downgrade or even exclude the 
popular component – since it is this particular component that depends so closely on party. 
Without parties, in other words, we are simply left with a stripped down version of 
constitutional democracy or Madisonian democracy; or we are left with other versions of 
democracy that are shorn of their popular component, such as Pettit’s republican polity (1998: 
303 – democracy “is never presented as the center-piece of the republican polity”), or such as 
those systems of modern governance that seek to combine ‘stakeholder participation’ with 
‘problem-solving efficiency’ (Kohler-Koch 2005). These are certainly not unthinkable forms 
of polity, but they are systems in which conventional popular democracy plays little or no 
significant role, and in which neither elections nor parties remain privileged. When 
democracy in Schattschneider’s terms becomes unthinkable, in short, other modes of 
democracy move to the fore. Hence the contemporary intellectual interest in the theory of 
democratic renewal, and hence the more practical interest–from Chua, Diamond and Zakaria 
among others–in proposing new forms of institutional politics. All of these approaches share a 
common concern to find or define a notion of democracy (a) that works; (b) that is seen to be 
legitimate; and yet (c) that no longer places at its centre the notion of popular control or 
electoral accountability.  
But in what sense are we without parties, and in what sense are they failing? My 
argument is that they are failing in two related ways, and I will go on to look at these at 
greater length below. First, as has now been well attested in the literature, parties are 
increasingly failing in their capacity to engage the ordinary citizen. As the overview which I 
present below clearly indicates, and as the participants in this workshop will know all too 
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well, citizens are voting in fewer numbers and with less sense of partisan consistency, and 
they are also increasingly reluctant to commit themselves to parties, whether in terms of 
identification or membership. In this sense, citizens are withdrawing from conventional 
political involvement.3 Second, the party can no longer adequately serve as a base for the 
activities and status of its own leaders, who increasingly direct their ambitions towards, and 
draw their resources from, external public institutions. Parties may provide a necessary 
platform for political leaders, but this is increasingly the sort of platform that is used to spring 
to other locations. In sum, parties are failing as a result of a process of mutual withdrawal, 
whereby citizens retreat into private life or into more specialised and often ad hoc forms of 
representation, and whereby the party leaderships retreat into the institutions, drawing their 
terms of reference ever more readily from their roles as governors or public-office holders. 
Parties are failing because the zone of engagement – the traditional world of party democracy 
where citizens interacted with and felt a sense of belonging towards their political leaders – is 
being evacuated. In the following section of the paper, I will look at this process in more 
detail. 
 




Let me first turn to the question of citizen withdrawal and disengagement from conventional 
politics. Two qualifying remarks should be emphasized from the beginning. First, this process 
of withdrawal is far from complete: indeed, in some respects, but not all, it is not much more 
than a trickle, and hence I am dealing with something that is ongoing rather than fully 
realized. Second, what I am discussing here is a familiar process which has already been dealt 
with, sometimes in great detail, elsewhere in the scholarly literature, as well as in more 
popular commentary. What has not usually been clarified, however, is how pervasive and 
wide-ranging the process actually is, in that while some aspects have received ample 
attention, others have not, and hence the whole gamut of features has not been brought 
together in one overall and accessible assessment. This section of the paper aims to do just 
that, and to indicate the breadth and variety of the modes of disengagement, even if some of 
these are less substantial than others.  
 Although concern with citizen disengagement from conventional politics is now more 
and more frequently expressed, both in the scholarly literature and in the popular media, the 
evidence of this withdrawal has sometimes been disputed. The evidence is also quite 
scattered, making it difficult to sketch an encompassing picture. A major purpose of this 
section of the paper is therefore to conduct an inventory, and to bring together the disparate 
sets of evidence with a view to underlining the degree of coherence and consistency that they 
reflect. Indeed, one of the reasons why this evidence, or, more properly, the weight of this 
evidence, is sometimes disputed, is because the different elements are seen in isolation from 
one another. The fact that levels of participation in national elections do not always register a 
sharp or very steady decline, for example, is sometimes cited as evidence of a continuing 
popular commitment to conventional politics, even though the small changes that so take 
place in this regard are often consistent with other trends that do appear to underline a wide-
scale pattern of withdrawal. In other words, even a small decline in, say, the level of turnout, 
may be seen to weigh more heavily when placed in the context of other shifts in mass political 
behaviour.  
                                                 
3 To which it must be added that they are then becoming involved in other areas of social and political activity. 
As Pattie et al. (2004: 107) argue in the case of Britain, the focus on conventional political institutions and 
behaviour tends to result in an exaggeration of “the public exit from civic behaviour.”  
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In fact, what we see here are two features that are not normally seen to be applicable to 
cross-national changes at the level of mass politics. The first of these is that virtually all of 
these separate pieces of evidence that will be cited here point in the same direction. This in 
itself is very unusual. Analysts of data relating to mass politics almost invariably expect to 
find mutually opposing trends in the different streams of indicators – that is, while one 
indicator might point in one direction, it is often contradicted by a second indicator pointing 
in a different direction. Mass politics rarely moves en bloc, as it were, but in this case it is 
precisely the consistency of the trends that is striking. Second, virtually all of these trends in 
the data are consistent across countries. This again is most unusual. The normal expectation in 
comparative political research is that while particular trends in mass politics may well be 
noted in some countries, they are almost never pervasive. Some countries may shift together, 
but it is only very rarely that all, or even most, shift in the same way and at the same time. 
What we see now, however, is a much clearer indication of cross-national convergence in the 
trends that matter. In other words, not only are these various trends now pointing in the same 




 So what sort of trends are we talking about here? Let me begin with the most obvious 
and most immediate indicator: the levels of participation in national elections. Given what has 
been said about citizen withdrawal in the more popular media in particular, it is with this 
indicator that we might expect some of the most striking trends to be identified. At the same 
time, however, it is often this particular evidence that is most strongly disputed. In other 
words, while various expectations regarding the possible decline in levels of electoral turnout 
have been current for some years, they have often been found to have little backing in the 
aggregate empirical data. Although long-term stability in levels of participation has been 
followed by a slight decline, this is usually not seen to be sharp enough that it becomes a 
source of worry for those concerned with the healthy functioning of modern democratic life.  
 Is this a reasonable conclusion? On the face of it, and especially with regard to the 
European data, this interpretation is certainly plausible.4 Thus through each of the four 
decades from the 1950s to the 1980s, average turnout levels in western Europe scarcely 
altered, increasing marginally from 84.3 per cent in the 1950s to 84.9 per cent in the 1960s, 
and then falling slightly to 83.9 per cent in the 1970s and to 81.7 per cent in the 1980s. This 
was essentially the steady-state period, as has been emphasized by Norris (2002: 54-5) and 
Franklin (2002). That said, the decline from the 1970s to the 1980s, while small, was 
remarkably consistent across the long-established European democracies, with just three 
(Belgium, Norway, The Netherlands) of the fifteen countries countering an otherwise general 
trend. The decline may have been marginal when looked at cross-nationally, but it was almost 
universal, and hence might well have justified a sense of concern. 
But what is even more important to note is that this very marginal shift accelerated in 
the 1990s, with average turnout across Western Europe falling from 81.7 per cent to 77.6 per 
cent in the last decade of the century. To be sure, even at this level, which is the lowest 
recorded in any of the postwar decades, turnout remains relatively high, with an average of 
slightly more than three-quarters of national electorates casting a ballot in the elections held 
during the 1990s, a figure that remains substantially higher than that recorded in nationwide 
elections in the United States, for example (see Franklin 2002). Even allowing for this, 
however, and even allowing for the fact that this drop from the 1980s to the 1990s is less than 
5 per cent, it is nevertheless striking to see the overall European figure now dipping below the 
                                                 
4 For details of the figures reported here, see Mair (2002b), from which the discussion of the aggregate indicators 
is largely drawn.  
 9
80 per cent level for the first time in five decades. Here also, moreover, there is a striking 
consistency across countries, in that 11 of the 15 democracies involved also recorded their 
lowest ever decade averages in the 1990s. The exceptions to this pattern again include 
Belgium, where the decade averages are almost invariant, but where the lowest level was 
recorded in the 1960s, and Denmark and Sweden, which both recorded their lowest levels in 
the 1950s. Even in these three cases, however, it should be noted that the average level of 
turnout in the 1990s was lower than in the 1980s. The fourth exception is the United 
Kingdom, which was unusual in recording its trough in participation in the 1980s. Indeed, the 
United Kingdom is the only one of these fifteen countries which recorded even a marginally 
higher level of turnout in the 1990s than in the 1980s, although in this case turnout later 
plunged to an all-time low of just 59 per cent in the first election of the 21st century.  
 This trend has also persisted into the beginning of the twenty-first century. As noted, 
the election of 2001 in the UK was marked by the lowest level of turnout since the advent of 
mass democracy. The 2002 parliamentary elections in both France and Ireland were also 
marked by historic low levels of turnout; the same was true of the 2001 elections in Italy and 
Norway, the 2002 election in Portugal, and the 2000 election in Spain. Levels that were close 
to historic lows were recorded in Greece in 2000, in Austria in 2002, and in Finland and 
Switzerland in 2003 (the last year included in this recording). By the beginning of the new 
century, in short, the trend towards ever lower levels of participation was continuing. Why 
this should be the case remains, of course, an open question, and it is something we will come 
back to at a later stage. It may simply reflect generational shifts. It may also be because of 
sheer boredom. The key point, however, is that we are seeing something that is both 
unidirectional and pervasive, and that offers a striking indicator of the growing enfeeblement 
of the electoral process.  
 Before leaving these crude turnout figures, it is worth noting one other way of seeing 
this picture that is perhaps even more telling. Indicators of turnout change are somewhat like 
those of climate change: the shifts that we see do not necessarily occur in great leaps or 
bounds, and are not always linear. Moreover, while indicating withdrawal and disengagement, 
change in turnout levels is often registered as simply a trickle rather than as a flood. For these 
reasons, and again like the indicators of climate change, the importance of what is often just a 
slight or uneven trend may be underestimated or even disputed. One way in which 
climatologists get around this problem is by laying less stress on the trends as such, and by 
noting instead patterns in the timing and frequency of the peak values in their indicators. This 
is, in fact, a very simple approach to measurement, which is also intuitively meaningful. Thus, 
for example, clear evidence of global warming is derived by noting that the warmest decade 
on record was the most recent, the 1990s, while 1998 emerges as the warmest single year, 
followed by 2001. Further evidence of global warming is adduced by noting that the eight 
warmest years on record have all occurred since 1990, even though in that same period air 
temperatures were also recorded (e.g., in 1992, 1993 and 1994) which were little more than 
those reached in the late 1970s (Jones and Moberg 2003). In other words, the pattern is 
evident, even if the trend is not wholly uniform. This is also more or less true of turnout 
levels, and indeed of many other indicators of mass political behaviour, and for this reason the 
extent of change at this level is also often underestimated. Although there is no undisturbed 
downward trend in levels of participation, for example, record lows now come with greater 






Table 1: Low Turnout Elections 
(a) Record Low Levels of Turnout in Western Europe, 1950-2003 
 
Country Years of Lowest Turnout (N = 3) 
Austria 
Belgium
1994, 1999, 2002 








ency of elec w turnout, by decade
Denmark 1950, 1953 (i), 1953
Finland 
France 
1991, 1995, 1999 
1988, 1997, 2002 
Germany 1990, 1994, 2002 
Iceland 
Ireland 
1995, 1999, 2003 
1992, 1997, 2002 
Italy 1994, 1996, 2001 
Luxembour
Netherla
89, 1994, 1999 
1994, 1998, 2002 
Norway 1993, 1997, 2001 
Swed
Switz
952, 1956, 1958 
1995, 1999, 2003 
UK 1970, 1997, 2001 
 
 
(b) Frequ tions with record lo  
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-59  13.3 
960-69  1  2.2 
970-79  2  4.4 
990-03 34 75.6 
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As can be seen from Table 1, which lists the three elections with the lowest levels of 
in each of the 15 long tablished E ean democracies, more than three-quarters of 
 elections have taken ce since 19 In other words, not only do the 1990s hold the 
or the lowest turnout ny postwa ade in western Europe (Mair, 2002b), but 
in the great majority of w  European racies, most, and sometimes even all of the 
arked by record low turnout have occurred since 1990. 
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individual national elections th
T
ent reasons, the lowest turnout elections fell in the 1950s. Beyond these cases, the onl
other odd exceptions are one low turnout election in the 1960s (in Belgium), two such 
elections in the 1970s (in Belgium and the UK), and two in the 1980s (in France and 
Luxembourg). The remaining 34 cases all date from 1990 or later. In other words, however
small the overall shifts in turnout might be, they are nevertheless clustering together in a 
remarkable fashion. Indeed, this pattern also extends to the newer southern European 
democracies: the three lowest levels of turnout recorded in post-authoritarian Greece were 
those in 1974, which was the first free election, in 1996, and in 2000; in Portugal, the lowest 
levels were recorded in 1995, 1999 and 2002; and in Spain in 1979, 1989 and 2000. He
in the long-established democracies, the more recent the election, the odds are that it w
record a trough in participation. There is no certainty here, of course; like the pattern evinced
by climate change, turnout also sometimes bucks the overall trend, even today. In the long
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term, however, the overall direction and reach of the change is unmistakable, and it off







A second key aggregate indicator that is relevant here relates to the behaviour of tho
citizens who do participate, and measures the extent to which their voting patterns reveal 
consistency and stability over time in the distribution of partisan preferences. Those c
who continue to vote in
se 
itizens 
 elections are clearly still engaged with conventional politics, even if 
oting itself is only a marginal token of engagement (e.g., Parry et al. 1992); as popular 
ver, and as indifference grows, we can anticipate that even these 
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 in the expressions of their preferences. If politics no longer counts for so much, then 
not only should the readiness to vote begin to fade, as has already been noted above, but so
also should the sense of partisan commitment among those who continue to take part. Choice
are likely to prove more contingent, and to be more susceptible to the play of short-term 
factors. In practice, this also means that election outcomes are likely to prove less predict
Electoral volatility is likely to increase; new parties and or new candidates are likely to pro
more successful; and traditional alignments are likely to come under pressure. Inconsistenc
goes hand in hand with indifference. 
As was the case with patterns in turnout, expectations about the growth in this form o
unpredictability in the balance of party support in national party systems in Western Europe 
have been current for a number of years. Here too, however, the empirical record at the 
aggregate level usually failed to meet these expectations. Thus while party systems in some 
countries did indeed experience a substantial increase in their levels of electoral flux through 
the 1970s and 1980s, others appeared to become even more stable than before, resulting in 
what was generally a “stable” and rela
western Europe as a whole (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Mair 1992). Here again, 
however, as with the evidence of turnout, we see the picture changing in the 1990s. Across 
Western Europe as a whole, the 1990s became the peak decade for electoral volatility, w
score of 12.6 per cent, almost 4 points higher than that recorded in the 1970s and 1980s. Not 
too much should be made of this, of course. On a scale which has a theoretical range running 
from 0 to 100, and which even here has a range of decade averages that run in practice from
2.5 (1950s Switzerland) to 22.9 (1990s Italy), a mean value of 12.6 still reflects more (sho
term) stability than change. On the other hand, the 1990s is the first of the five postwa
decades in which the overall mean of instability breaches the 10 per cent threshold, while it 
also the first decade to record such a major shift from the previous mean value.  
 The significance of the 1990s can also be underlined by reference to the individual 
national experiences. Thus, in all but four of the countries (the exceptions are Denmark, 
France, Germany and Luxembourg), the 1990s also constitute a national peak in volatility 
levels, which, in the majority of cases, easily exceeds 10 per cent. This confluence is also 
unprecedented, and again signals that the patterns at the end of the century are markedly
different from those of the earlier postwar years.  
 As in the case of the turnout data, there is no sign that these new excesses
in the new century. Already in elections in 2002, both Austria and the Netherlands 
experienced record high levels of aggregate instability, as did Italy in 2001. France, Norw
and Sweden also recorded remarkably high levels of volatility in their first twenty-first 
 
5 This is also the conclusion drawn by Paterson (2002) in his valuable lengthy study of the American case. 
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century elections, although in these cases no absolute records were broken. More generally
can be seen in Table 2, a clear majority of the most unstable national elections to be recor
since 1950 have occurred since 1990. The very sim
, as 
ded 




again borrowed from the climatologists, and follows the breakdown applied to the turnout 
data in Table 1 above. In this case the pattern is not so one-sided: volatility data ine
prove more erratic than turnout data, being quickly responsive to both political crises as well 
as to institutional and social-structural change (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 253-308). 
Nevertheless, it is again striking how exceptional seems the period since 1990: not only do 
more than half of the record national highs in volatility fall in this period, but it is also 
noteworthy that no other decade comes even close to matching this clustering. Indeed, in no 
other decade does the number of high volatility elections come even close to double figures
With the marginal exceptions of Denmark and Luxembourg, at least to date, it seems that th
more recent the election, the less likely it is to yield a predictable outcome.  
 
Table 2: High Volatility Elections 
(a) Record High Levels of Volatility in Western Europe, 1950-2003 
 
Country Years of Highest Volatility 
(N = 3) 
ustria 1990, 1994, 2002 A
Belgium 1965, 1981, 2003 
ermany 1953, 1961, 1990 





ncy of elec igh volatility, by decade
Denmark 1973, 1975, 1977 
Finland 1970, 1991, 1995 
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1954, 1984, 1989 
1994, 1998, 2002 
Norway 1989, 1997, 2001 
Sweden 
Switzerlan
1991, 1998, 2002 
1987, 1991, 1999 
UK 1974(i), 1978, 199
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 11.1 
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, altho ls in themselves still remain reasonably high, while among 
e who do part reater likelihood that they will switch their preferences 











What we see since 1990, therefore, is that ev
in elections ugh turnout leve
thos icipate, there is a g
6fr
                                                 
6 This counters an earlier observation based on the US data by Bennett (1998: 745), who suggested that even 
though conventional political participation may be in decline, “those who continue to participate in traditional 
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since 1990 (whether recordin oughs in  case of turnout, or peaks in the case of volatility) 
estern Europe as a w le, but th  also tend to the extreme in a large majority of 
idual polities. That i  extre ws in turnout and extreme peaks in volatility 
n recorded since 199 n almost f the long established European democracies. 
eptions were Luxembourg, which had very low turnout but only moderate volatility; 
den, which recorded high latility b  exceptionally low turnout; and Denmark, 
hich proved extreme on neither indicator during this recent period. Beyond these cases, the 
videnc
g tr  the
across w ho ey are
the indiv s, both me lo
have bee 0 i  all o
The exc
Swe  vo ut not
w
e e of unusual patterns since 1990 is not only striking, but it is also consistent. Across 
Western Europe, voters are not only pulling back from the act of voting, but they are also 
pulling back in terms of partisan commitment. In these heightened levels of instability, we 
therefore see a second strong aggregate indicator of disengagement. 
 
Partisan Attachment  
 
 This is also the message that comes through more and more clearly from various 
survey data. That is, the often substantial shifts evinced by these aggregate data on turnout 
and volatility now correspond closely to the evidence about individual-level experiences as 
tapped by election studies and commercial polling projects. Many of these latter data have 
been collated and summarised by Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) in their comprehensive 
volume on Parties without Partisans, and what is also striking in this instance is both the 
consistency and the pervasiveness of the various changes that have been observed. One key
indicator revealed by the survey data, for example, is the degree to which individual voters 
eel a sense of belonging or commitment to particular political parties, a feeling which is 
 
easures of partisan identification. And on this key indicator, according 







Voters are also less ready or less able to decide in advance how they will vote, preferring to 
 
   
f
captured by various m
o the Dalton and Wattenberg data, decline is mt
countries (including a number of non-European polities) for which relevant data are avail
–the two exceptions are Belgium and Denmark–the percentage of voters claiming a sense o
identification with parties has fallen over the past two decades or so. Even more strikingly, t
smaller numbers of voters who report a strong sense of belonging or identification has also 
decidedly fallen, and this time in every single one of the countries concerned. As Dalton 
notes, it is not just the scale of the decline that is important here, but more the fact that it 
occurs in each of the cases for which data are available. There therefore seems little that is 
either contingent or circumstantial: “The similarity in trends for so many nations forces us to
look beyond specific and idiosyncratic explanations…For public opinion trends to be so 
consistent across so many nations, something broader and deeper must be occurring” (Dalton 
2000: 29)  
 Further evidence of this broader and deeper process can be seen in the other sets of 
survey data that Dalton and his colleagues marshal. Split-ticket voting, for example, whereby 
voters opt for one party in one electoral arena, and for another party in another electoral arena, 
is also on the rise across all those cases where it can be measured over time (Australia, 
Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the United States). A committed and engaged voter, with a 
strong partisan loyalty, will undoubtedly vote for the same party regardless of the arena 
involved–for example, voting Democrat in U.S. Presidential and Congressional elections, as
well as probably in local state and county elections. Less partisan commitment, and less 
engagement, is more likely to be associated with more free-range voting patterns, and hence 
with a greater willingness to split the ticket; and it is this latter practice which is growing.
observe the campaign, or even to remain disinterested, until closer to polling day itself. Here
                                                                                                                                                     
politics exhibit stability and substance in electoral choice, opinion formation, and policy deliberation.” Looking 
at the west European data, it appears that they don’t.  
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too, with a single Danish exception, it seems that this pattern is more and more prevalent, with
almost ever
 
y election study reporting an evident increase in the proportion of voters who 





m heir decision how to vote either during the campaign or only shortly before the day o
the election. Again, the implication is one of a lack of commitment on the part of voters, and 
hence also a lack of engagement. One way or the other, as the compilers of these data 
conclude, “the trend is clear: contemporary voters are less likely to enter elections with 
standing partisan predispositions” (Dalton et al. 2000: 49). It is also then hardly surprising to
see that these voters are also far less likely to engage in more demanding campaign activ
whether this might be by way of attending political meetings, working for a party or 
candidate, persuading others to vote in a particular way, or even donating money. On alm
all of these measures, and in almost all the countries for which data are available, the survey 
evidence once again clearly points to decline: individual voters are less and less willing to 
participate in this more demanding sense – for many, at least as far as conventional politics is




 Voters are also obviously much less willing to take on the obligations and 
commitments associated with membership in party organizations. Here too, it is strikin
note not only the sheer decline in the number of party members over time, but also the e
to which this decline seems characteristic of all long-established democracies (Mair and van 
Biezen 2001). Although the pattern here is more pronounced than in the case of changes in 
levels of turnout or changes in levels of electoral instability, the way in which conclu
have been drawn about party membership levels tend to echo those drawn about the more 
general levels of participation. That is, though to the 1980s, the evidence of decline in this 
form of political engagement tended to be somewhat equivocal, and it has also been 
sometimes disputed.  




l. 1992) found that although the party membership ratio had fallen in most of the European 
ch data could be traced, the absolute levels of membership had often held 
p. In other words, while there was a decline in the numbers of party members when 









ers of political parties. At the 
a
polities for which su
u
m ed in proportion to the various national electorates (the only exceptions wer
of Belgium and West Germany), which were themselves expanding substantially in this 
period, there was little evidence of decline in the actual numbers involved. In general, these 
data offered little support for the idea that these countries were then experiencing “a spreadin
disillusionment with partisan politics” (Norris 2002: 134, 135). 
By the end of the 1990s, however, and regardless of whatever conclusions might hav
been drawn from the survey data, the patterns in the aggregate data had become unequivoc
The Mair and van Biezen (2001) data included 13 long-established European democracies, 
and in each of these countries the ratio of party membership to the electorate at large 
fallen markedly betwe
 2000: 86-95). That is, there was not one single European case in which the 
membership ratio had remained steady, let alone increased. In 1980, an average of 9.8 per 
cent of the electorates in the 13 long-established democracies were party members; by the end 
of the 1990s, this had fallen to just 5.7 per cent. To put it another way, and to trace the 
contrast back even further, at the beginning of the 1960s there were ten democracies in 
Europe for which it is possible to trace reliable membership figures, and across all ten the
average membership ratio was 14 per cent; in a majority–in six of the ten–of the countries, th
ratio was above 10 per cent. That is, in a majority of the countries for which data were 









1990s, by contrast, there were 20 democracies for which it was possible to find reliable 
membership data, some old democracies, some new. Across all 20, the average membership 
ratio was just 5 per cent, little more than a third of the level recorded in the early 1960s, and
of these 20 countries, only one – Austria – recorded a ratio that exceeded 10 per cent.7 
This evidence of uniform decline was also reinforced by the figures on the absol
numbers of party members, for here too, and in marked contrast to the earlier pattern
Katz, Mair et al. (1992), the fall-off was pervasive: in each and every one of the long-
established democracies included in the analysis, the absolute numbers of party members had 
fallen, sometimes by as much as 50 per cent of the 1980s levels. In no single country, h
there been an increase in the number of party members. This was exit on a grand scale –
in terms of reach and direction. Throughout the old democracies, as the analysis concluded
parties were simply haemorrhaging members (Mair and van Biezen 2001: 13).  
 
Popular Withdrawal: A Summary 
 
So what can we conclude from this brief review of the evidence regarding citizen 
behaviour in Western Europe? The most obvious conclusion is that it has now become more 




ia to play the 
le of agenda-setter, and requiring a much greater campaign effort from parties and 
ort, is a form of voting behaviour that is increasingly 







                                                
–that is, they are withdrawing and disengaging from involvement in big ‘P’ politics. 
Even when they vote, and this is less often than before, or in smaller proportions, their 
preferences emerge closer and closer to the moment of voting itself, and are now les ea
guided by cohesive partisan cues. For whatever reason, and there is no shortage of hypotheses 
that have been advanced to explain this change, there are now fewer and fewer standpatters
and hence there are also more and more citizens who, when thinking about politics at all, are 
likely to operate on the basis of short-term considerations and influences. Electorates in this 
sense are becoming progressively destructured, affording more scope to the med
ro
candidates. What we see here, in sh
f this change has only become really apparent since the end of the 1980s. 
 To be sure, we are dealing with sometimes quite small pieces of evidence here, and th
changes which have been noted are also sometimes, but not always, relatively marginal. As
was stated in the beginning, we therefore sometimes deal with a trickle rather than a flood. 
But when all of these disparate pieces of evidence, great and small, are summed togethe
offer a very clear indication that there has been a marked shift in the prevailing patterns of 
mass politics. This shift is not only consistent in terms of its focus–that is, all of these 
indicators now point in a common direction–but is also remarkably consistent across the 
different European polities. The conclusion is then clear: all over Western Europe, and in all 
likelihood all over the advanced democracies, citizens are heading for the exits of the nationa
political arena. As in the US case as depicted by Hibbings and Theiss-Morse (2002: 232) “a 
passive democracy can settle for a passive citizenry… A vigorous democracy is the la
people want, and forgetting entirely about politics is precisely what they do want.”  
 
7 The pattern is comparable in the advanced democracies outside Europe. In Australia in 1967 there were 
251,000 members, the equivalent of 4.1 per cent of the electorate; in 1997, the number had fallen to 231,000, 
equivalent to just 1.9 per cent of the then much expanded electorate – see the figures in McAllister (2002: 389-
90); in Canada, the fall-off was from 462,000 members in 1987 to 372,000 in 1994, or from 2.6 per cent of the 
electorate to 1.9 per cent (Carty 2002: 355); in New Zealand, the decline was from 272,000 members in 1981, or 
12.5 per cent of the electorate, then the peak of a growing wave, to 133,000 in 1999, or 4.8 per cent of the 
electorate (Vowles 2002: 416-419).  
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In early 2002, in an interview with the Dutch social science magazine Facta, Anthony 
Giddens drew attention to the changes which had recently been wrought in mass media 
tizen 








 limits of 
apparent 
istress at the hollowing out of mass politics, there exists in the practice of organized 
atch citizen withdrawal with elite withdrawal. That is, just as 
itizens retreat to their own private and particularized spheres of interest, so too do the political 
e other 
                                                
entertainment through the growing popularity of docu-soaps and reality television. “A 
watershed has been passed here,” he noted. “Previously television was something that 
reflected an external world which people watched. Now television is much more a medium in 
which you can participate….’8 In conventional politics, by contrast, the shift has been the 
other way around. Previously, and probably through to at least the 1970s, conventional 
politics was seen to belong to the citizen, and was seen to be something in which the ci
could, and often did, participate. Now, to paraphrase Giddens, conventional politics has 
become part of an external world which people watch from outside. There is a world of the 
parties, or a world of political leaders, that is separate from the world of the citizenry. As 
Bernard Manin (1997: 218-235) put it a few years ago, what we now witness is the 
transformation of party democracy into ‘audience democracy’.9 Whether the increasing 
withdrawal and disengagement of voters is responsible for the emergence of this new
, or whether it is an emerging form of politics that is encouraging voter withdrawal and 
disengagement is, at least for now, a moot point. What is beyond dispute is that each fee
other. As citizens exit the national political arena, they inevitably weaken the major act
who survive there – the political parties. And this, in turn, is part of, and promotes, aud
democracy. As Sartori (2002: 78) puts it, ‘video politics’ – and hence also audience 
democracy – is stronger when parties are weak, and it is weaker when parties are strong. 
Strong parties are difficult to sustain when politics turns into a spectator sport.  
 
The Withdrawal of the Elites 
 
On the face of it, we might anticipate that popular withdrawal from conventional politics wo
leave a lot of angry and frustrated politicians in its wake. Indeed, given how difficult i
become to engage citizens in the conventional political arena, we might well expect that pa
and political leaders will devote a considerable effort to try to keep politics alive and 
meaningful. At a certain level, this is in fact the case, and, as noted above, there has rarely been 
such widespread discussion of institutional reform, whether this involves reform of the electoral 
system, parliamentary procedures, local or regional government, or plebiscitary mechanisms, or 
whatever. Almost none of the advanced democracies has proved immune from these 
discussions, and almost all have devoted considerable research effort to discussing the
their present institutional arrangements and the ways in which they might be changed– 
sometimes quite drastically so. But beneath the beating of official breasts and the 
d
democracy a clear tendency to m
c
and party leaders retreat into their own version of this private and particular sphere, which in 
their case is constituted by the closed world of the governing institutions. In other words, 
disengagement tends to be mutual, and for all the rhetoric that is to be heard on each side of the 
political divide, in practice both are cutting loose.  
 The changes in the forms of party politics which followed from the emergence of the 
catch-all party and its later successors, as well as the transformation in the patterns of party 
competition with which these changes can now be associated, may be specified under two broad 
headings: the location of the parties, on the one hand, and their political identity, on th
 
8 Interview with Anthony Giddens by Henk Jansen in Facta 11:1, February 2003, pp. 2-5, at page 4 (my 
translation). 
9 For a comparable discussion, see Statera (1986) and Sartori (2002). For an earlier version of some of the 
arguments here, see Mair (1998).  
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hand. As far as location is concerned, which is the main concern of this particular section of the 
paper, the last decades of this century have witnessed a gradual but also inexorable with
of political parties from the realm of civil society towards the realm of government and the 
state. As far as their political identities are concerned, which is a topic to be addressed
different context, the end of the century has seen the gradual erosion of partisan distinctiveness
and the blurring of inter-party boundaries. Together, these two parallel processes have led to a 
situation in which each party tends to become more distant from the voters that it purports to 
represent while at the same time tending to become more closely associated with the vario
protagonists against whom it purports to compete. Party-voter distances have become more 
stretched, while party-party differences have becom
drawal 
 in a 
, 
us 















ent within a wider 
e 
combining to reinforcing a growing popular indifference to parties and, potentially, to the wor
of politics in general. This also becomes one of the sources of the growing popular distrust o
parties and of political institutions more generally. 
 Although there is some dispute among observers about how precisely the recent 
transformation of parties might best be understood, and particularly those changes which have 
followed in the wake of the catch-all party and have led to the emergence of the cartel party 
(Katz and Mair 1995), there is at least consensus about the two broadly-defined processes w
lie behind these transformations. On the one hand, party organizations, however defined, ar
now less strongly rooted within the wider society. On the other hand, they are also now more 
strongly oriented towards government and the state. Hence, if we conceive of parties as standin
somewhere between society and the state, which is the most obvious approach to understandin
their role and location within a democratic polity, then we can also suggest that they have 
shifted along the continuum which links society to the state, and that they have moved from a 
position in which they were primarily defined as social actors–as in the classic mass party
model–to one where they might now be reasonably defined as state actors. 
 Evidence of the erosion of the parties’ roots in society has been reviewed above, and 
incorporates most of the trends that were discussed 
have seen, the strength of electoral identification with political parties is now almost univ
in decline, and the sense of belonging to party has been substantially eroded. Levels of party 
membership are now markedly lower than was the case even twenty years ago, and other 
evidence suggests that those members who remain within the parties tend to be less active and 
engaged. At the same time, the former privileges of membership have also tended to disappea
in that the demands of electoral success are now encouraging party leaders to look beyond thei
shrinking membership to the electorate at large. The voice of the ordinary voter is seen to be at 
least as relevant to the party organization as that of the active party member, and the views of 
focus groups often count more than those of conference delegates.10 In addition, a sense of
dissipation and fragmentation also tends to mark the broader organizational environment withi
which the classic mass parties used to nest. As workers’ parties, or as religious parties, the 
parties in Europe rarely stood on their own, but constituted just the core elem
and more complex organizational network of trade unions, churches, or whatever. Beyond the 
socialist and religious parties, additional networks of farming groups, business associations and 
even social clubs combined with political organizations to create a generalized pattern of social 
and political segmentation which helped to root the other old mass parties into place within th
                                                 
10 As, for example, when British Labour leaders shrugged off their defeat when the Labour Annual Conference 
voted to restore the link between pensions and average earnings. The vote had gone 60-40 against the leadership, 
and the proposal for change had been made by the delegated trade union leaders. Gordon Brown responded: “I’m
not going to give in to the proposal that came from the union leaders today….It is for the country to judge, it is 
not for a few composite motions to decide the policy of this government and this country. It is for the whole 
 
community, and I’m listening to the whole community.” Quoted by Michael White, ‘Angry Brown defies 
unions’, The Guardian [Europe] 28.09.00. 
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society and to stabilize and distinguish their electorates. Over at least the past thirty years, 
however, these broader networks have tended to break up. In part, this is because of a 
weakening of the sister organizations themselves, with churches, trade unions and other 
traditional forms of association losing both members and the sense of engagement. With the 
increasingly individualisation of society, traditional collective identities and organizational 
affiliations count for less, including those that once formed part of party-centred networks. As 
Rudy Andeweg (2003: 151) has noted, “religion is increasingly expressed outside churches, 
interest promotion is taken care of outside interest associations, such as trade unions, physical 
exercise outside sports clubs…., work outside permanent employment, love outside marria
and even gender differences are becoming divorced from sex differences.” Small wond
that the collectivities that once sustained parties have become so enfeebled.  
 But this is not the whole story, for party networks have also weakened as the result of
sharpening division of labour, with the parties themselves often seeking to reduce the weigh
their ties to associated groups, and to downplay the privileged access which was formerly 
accorded to affiliated organizations.11 In other words, the landscape has also been changed by
the increasing tendency of parties to think of themselves as self-sufficient and specialized 
political organizations, that are willing to heed any cues provided by any of the various social 
actors, but that prefer to remain unrestrained by close formalized links to these actors. Parties 














tion may function. Many of 
 largely ‘private’ and voluntary associations which developed 
ithin  
official status as part of the state. In other words, as the internal life and even the external 
s me, they have become ever more firmly and inextricably caught up in the world of 
government and the state. This process of party change has been fully analysed elsewhere and 
need not be detailed again here.12 Suffice it to summarise a number of key developments w
have marked most western democracies in the last decades of the twentieth-century, and which
look likely to become even more reinforced in future generations. 
 In the first place, as is now widely recognized, parties in most democracies have moved
from a position in which they were principally dependent for their organizational survival on t
resources provided by members, donors and affiliated organization to one in which are now 
increasingly reliant on public funds and state support, such that in most countries today, an
particular in almost all newly-established democracies, the preferred source of party funding ha
become the public purse.13  
 Second, parties are now increasingly subject to new state laws and regulations, which 
sometimes even determine the way in which their internal organiza
these regulations and party laws were first introduced or were substantially extended in the 
wake of the introduction of public funding for parties, with the distribution of state subventions 
inevitably demanding the introduction of a more codified system of party registration and 
control. Controlling party access to the public broadcasting media has also required a new 
system of regulations, which again acts to codify the status of parties and their range of 
activities. From having been
w the society, and which drew their legitimacy therein, parties have therefore increasingly
become subject to a regulatory framework which has the effect of according them a (quasi-) 
activities of parties become regulated by public law, and as party rules become constitutional 
or administrative rules, the parties themselves become transformed into public service 
agencies, with a corresponding weakening of their own internal organizational autonomy (see 
Bartolini and Mair 2001: 340). 
                                                 
11 A trend already noted in nuce by Otto Kirchheimer (1966) in his then highly prescient analysis of party 
development in the advanced democracies. 
12 See Katz and Mair, 1995, 2002; see also van Biezen’s (2004) notion of parties as public utilities. 
13 For a recent overview of the patterns involved and the guidelines used, see van Biezen (2003). 
 19
 Finally, and perhaps most obviously, parties have also cemented their linkage to the 
state and to the public institutions by increasingly prioritising their role as governing (as 
opposed to representative) agencies. In the terms adopted by the analysts of coalition formation, 
parties have become more office-seeking, with the winning of a place in government being
not only a standard expectation, but also an end in itself. Some forty years ago, a now classic 
review of political developments in western democracies was organized around the theme o
‘oppositions’ (Dahl 1966); nowadays, however, within the world of the conventional party 
politics, there is less and less sense of enduring opposition, and more and more the idea of a 
temporary displacement from office. Opposition, when structurally constituted, now 
increasingly comes from outside conventional party politics, whether in the form of social 
movements, street politics, popular protests and boycotts, or whatever. Within politics, on
other hand, the parties are either all governing or waiting to govern. They are now all in office. 
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needs to be most clearly underlined. It is not that the citizens are disengaging and leaving 
                                                
the downgrading of the role of the ‘party on the ground’, and an evident enhancement of the 
role of the party in the institutions. In other words, within party organizations, there has b
shift in the party centre of gravity towards those elements and actors that serve the needs of the 
party in parliament and in government; as Maurizio Cotta (2000: 207) notes, “those who control 
the government appear to be better able than in the past to also control from that position the 
whole party”. This shift might also be seen as a final manifestation of the classic Downsian or
Schumpeterian notion of parties as ‘competing teams of leaders’, in which the party 
organization outside the institutions of the polity, and the party on the ground in all of its 
various manifestations, gradually wither away. What we see is ‘the ascendancy of the
public office’ (Katz and Mair 2002). What remains is a governing class. 
 All of this has had major implications for the functions that parties perform, and are see
to perform, within the wider polity. Conventionally, parties are seen to integrate and, if 
necessary, to mobilize the citizenry; to articulate and aggregate interests, and then to translate 
these into public policy; to recruit and promote political leaders, and to organize the parliamen
the government, and the key institutions of the state. That is, just as parties aimed to combine 
government for the people with government by the people, so too they combined key 
representative functions with key procedural functions–all within the same agency. As parties 
have changed, however, and as the mass party model has passed away, the functions which 
parties can–or do–perform in contemporary polities have also been rebalanced, such that they 
now lay much more emphasis on procedural functions alone.14 This development goe
hand with the concurrent move of parties from society to the state, and is therefore also par
the process by which parties and their leaders separate themselves from the arena of popular 
democracy.  
 The key element within this transformation, whether seen in terms of the location of the 
parties within the polity, or in terms of the functions parties are expected to perform, is th
ascendancy of the party in public office. Parties have reduced their presence in the wider socie
and have become part of the state. They have become agencies that govern–in the widest sense 
of the term–rather than represent. They bring order rather than give voice. It is in this sense th
we can also speak of the disengagement or withdrawal of the elites, although with th
obvious difference: while the exiting citizens are often headed towards more privatised or 
individualised worlds, the exiting political elites are retreating into an official world – a w
of public offices. 
 But although the safe havens that are being sought in the wake of the passing of the 
mass party may be different, the process of withdrawal is mutual, and it is this conclusion tha
 
14 I discuss this at greater length in Mair (2003). 
 20
hapless politicians behind, or that politicians are retreating and leaving voiceless citizens in
the lurch. Bo
 













y mutual consent: by the consent of 
ose who govern and those who are governed. The result has been the emergence of a new 





place, it is evident that the gap which has opened through this mutual withdrawal from the 
arena o
 
nd, and as 
o 
n 
                                              
sequence in which one of the movements leads to the other, and hence in which only one side
is assumed to be responsible for the ensuing gap – the crude populist interpretation – it m
much more sense to think of a process that is mutually reinforcing (see also Hibbings and 
Thiess-Morse 2002). The elites are inclined to withdraw to the institutions as a defence 
against the uncertainties in the electoral market. Just as state subventions to political parties 
have compensated for the inability of parties to raise sufficient resources from their own
members and supporters, so the security of an institutional or procedural role can compensa
elites for the vulnerability they experience when dealing with an increasingly disengaged and 
random electorate
politics that no longer seem to be part of their own world. Traditional politics is seen less an
less as something that belongs to the citizens or to the society, and is instead seen as 
something that is done by politicians. There is a world of the citizens–or a host of 
particularized worlds of the citizens–and a world of the politicians and parties, and the 
interaction between these worlds steadily diminishes. Citizens turn from being participants
into spectators, while the elites win more and more space in which to pursue their own shared 
interests. As Hanna Pitkin (2004: 339) recently put it:  
 
“Our governors have become a self-perpetuating elite that rules – or rather, 
administers – passive or privatised masses of people. The representatives act not as 
agents of the people but simply instead of them….They are professionals, entrench
in office and in party structures. Immersed in a distinct culture of their own, 
surrounded by other specialists and insulated from the ordinary realities of 
constituents’ lives, they live not just physically but also mentally ‘inside the beltway.’”
 
It seems pointless trying to establish where this process might have been initia
by whom. What matters is that it is mutually reinforcing, and that the ensuing gap b
rulers and ruled–or, perhaps more accurately, between administrators and administered–
being stretched by the withdrawal that is taking place on both sides of the divide. 
Conventional politics becomes marked by passivity and indifference–albeit occasionally 
broken or challenged by populist protest – and does so b
th
 politics, one in which the citizens stay at home while the parties become, or
, governors. 
5. Fallouts 
re two immediate fall-outs from this process that can be briefly noted. In the first 
f conventional party politics has sometimes helped to fuel a populist mobilization – 
usually, but not exclusively, on the right (see, for example, Mény and Surel 2002; Mudde 
2004). In other words, partly as a result of this process of withdrawal, the political class has
itself become an issue of contention in a large number of democratic polities. Seco
noted above, the growing gap between citizens and their political leaders has also helped t
fuel demands for more ‘non-majoritarian’ decision-making, and for a greater role to be 
accorded to various non-partisan and non-political agencies–to judges, regulatory bodies, 
central banks, international organizations and, most grandly, to the EU itself.15 In short, give
   
 I deal with this issue at greater length elsewhere (Mair 2004). 15
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the problems faced by conventional processes of political representation, we see the emphasis 













cumstances and that would 
but there is no guarantee that they will prove successful in this regard. On the contrary: while 
fa
Dutch populist Pim Fortuyn–Professor Fortuyn, as he liked to be called, who filled his par
list with doctors, civil servants and other professionals – we get both at the same time.16 
 There are also longer-term fall-outs, however, and these are more serious, in that it is
through these that democracy comes seriously under stress. In the first place, as I have argu
elsewhere (Mair 2002), it is largely through the separation of representative and procedural 
party functions, and through the schism between a party presence, or lack of presence, in civil
society and that in the institutions, that the idea of distinguishing between popular democracy
and constitutional democracy comes to the fore. Parties have always been unique 
organizations that combined within one agency the crucial functions of representation and 
government. That is, through party, one and the same institution within mass democracy gave 
voice to the citizenry and governed on their behalf. In such a context, epitomised most clearly 
by the presence of the mass party and by the reliance on the legitimacy afforded by party 
democracy and party government–for which, again, see Schattschneider (1942)–popular and 
constitutional democracy were more or less inseparable. In theory, the one could scarcely
conceived without the other; in practice, in party practice, they were effectively synthesised.  
 Through the failings of party, on the other hand, and through the gap that opens up 
between the citizenry and the political leaderships, comes a growing inability to affect this 
sort of synthesis. And it is this, in turn, which allows the two modes of democracy to become 
distinguished from one another. Through the failings of party, in other words, a space is 
created in which the features of popular democracy, taken more or less on its own,
weighed against those of constitutional democracy; through the separation of representative
and procedural functions, government ‘by the people’ comes to be judged against government 
‘for the people’. It is in this sense that the failings of party leads to a rethink of democracy: 
since parties cease to function as they once did, the conventional modes of democracy bec
unthinkable. Moreover, in this newly attractive weighing process, it is usually popular 
democracy, and government by the people, that is found wanting. 
 The difficulty runs even deeper than this, however. As argued above, parties were 
unique in combining both a representative and a procedural role, and in being engaged both
the wider society and in government. Over time, however, as I have also argued here, these 
two functions became separated from one another and rebalanced, with the role in society, 
and the representative function, being slowly downgraded and diminished, while the role
the institutions, and the procedural function, became more important. Elsewhere, I have 
argued that this was part of a more or less necessary process of party adaptation: precisely 
because they no longer functioned so effectively as representatives, parties sought to 
compensate by building up their role within the institutions. They may have grown less 
capable of giving voice to citizens, but they had also come to be regarded as an essential 
element in the functioning of democracy. These were not therefore parties in decline, I 
argued, but were instead parties that had adapted to a new set of cir
seek to survive in the context of a new organizational equilibrium (e.g., Mair 2003). 
 This now seems far too sanguine an interpretation, however. Parties might well seek to 
compensate for diminished capacities in one direction with enhanced capacities in another, 
                                                 
16 Trying to get both at the same time is not necessarily exceptional, and recalls James Morone’s (1990: 98) 
characterization of the Progressive Movement in America: “At the heart of the Progressive agenda lay a political 





parties might well have the capacity to govern, and be unchallenged – democratically – in th
respect, their abandonment of a representative role can mean that they are unable to legitimiz
that role. Parties may be able to fill public offices, but they may no longer be able to justi
doing so. 
In other words, if parties as governors are to be trusted, and if party government m
generally is to be legitimate, it is likely that the parties must also be seen to be representa
For a party, and for an elected politician, it is not enough to be just a good governor, for 
without some degree of representative legitimacy, neither the parties themselves, nor their 
leaders, nor even the electoral process that allows them to be chosen, will be seen to carry 
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people. Parties may be seen as necessary for the effective functioning of democracy, but this 
doesn’t mean that they are liked or respected. The distinction is already evident in popular 
evaluations: thus Dalton and Weldon (2004: 382) have recently shown that although an 
average of some 76 per cent of respondents in surveys conducted in 13 advanced democracies 
regard parties as necessary to the functioning of democracy, only some 30 per cent see these 
same parties as being interested in what ordinary people think; in the Eurobarometer data, 
parties em
ment of some 17 per cent of the European public, as against an average of 65 per cent 
who trust the police, for example, 56 per cent who trust television, and 49 per cent who trust 
the churches (Dalton and Weldon 2004: 385).  
Scepticism towards elected politicians is nothing new, of course. Already some 60 
years ago, for example, Schumpeter (1947: 288) warned against relying too heavily on thos
who were emerging from the electoral process, and suggested that “the qualities of intellect 
and character that make a good candidate are not necessarily those that make a good 
administrator, and selection by means of success at the polls may work against people who 
would be successes at the head of affairs.” The argument that was later reiterated by March 
and Olsen (1995: 136), who suggested that “it is not self-evident that electoral political 
competition will necessarily produce leaders who represent the interests of the people well or 
who are competent to govern.”17 But while the skepticism may not be new, it does acquire 
more robust foundation when articulated within a context in which popular democracy has
become distanced from constitutional democracy. Again, what we see here is a largely self-
reinforcing process. Because partisanship and politics are no longer seen as beneficial to the 
policy process, decision-making becomes depol
l agencies acquiring more weight and authority. This in turn hollows out political an
party competition even further, thereby offering even more encouragement to the politics of 
the spectacle and the horse-race. And this, in turn, becomes yet more likely to produce the so
of candidates and elected politicians whose qualities, following Schumpeter, are even
inclined to be those of the good administrator. Hence more depoliticization, hence even more 
hollowing-out of the electoral process, and hence even less competent candidates, and so on.
Sartori, as is so often the case, already drew attention to this dilemma some time 
In a text from 1967 (that was finally published in 2005) he argued that the real justification for
party was derived by virtue of its representative capacities, and not just because it provided 
government. Indeed, if government was our only concern, he argued, there were probably 
other and even better ways of providing it than through the resort to parties. Echoing 
Schumpeter’s concerns, he concluded (2005: 29): 
 
17 See also Brittan (1975: 136): “The attitudes and abilities that make for a good candidate are not necessarily 
those of a good MP, and a good MP is not necessarily a good minister. Above all there is a danger that the 
political process may repel men who could make a success of anything else.” 
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“If we have the party as a recruiter, it is because we want ‘representative’ leadership, 
that is, because we are interested in a mechanism of recruitment that fulfills the 
expressive function. Supposing that parties do not secure representative leadership; 
supposing that they are not utilized as a means of ‘expressive selection’; then why 
should we have recourse to party recruitment? Surely the answer is not that parties 
remain the best means of qualitative selection. Qualitatively speaking, the party 
channel has often produced very poor leadership. Therefore, if we no longer look for 
‘responsible’ leaders who are an ‘expression’ of their electors, we can think of a 
number of better ways of securing a political class that meets the qualitative standard
 
So back to the earlier questions: why do parties fail, and why do they fail now?
short answer is that they have moved too close to t
.” 
 The 
he institutions of the state, and they have 
conseq





has bro en 
being f
theory and practice, and a concomitant downgrading of the role of popular involvement. 
Faced w  
uently neglected, or have been forced to neglect, their representative role. Although 
y be seen as a strategy of survival, in which new weaknesses become compensat
engths, it probably cannot succeed in the longer term. In other words, unless parties 
 representative, they will experience considerable difficulty in legitimizing their 
ural role.  
Party democracy worked well when it provided the synthesis between popular 
acy and constitutional democracy. As parties have changed, however, this synthesis 
ken down, with the one mode being increasingly weighed against the other, and th
ound wanting. The failings of party therefore stimulate a rethink of democracy both in 
ith the failings of parties, democracy is encouraged to go beyond parties. Faced with
the failings of parties, we find ourselves reaching for a democracy without the demos.  
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